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ABSTRACT
According to the current copyright statute, copyrighted works of music, film, and
literature will begin to transition into the public domain in 2018. While this will prove a boon
for users and creators, it could be disastrous for the owners of these valuable copyrights.
Therefore, the next few years will likely witness another round of aggressive lobbying by the
film, music, and publishing industries to extend the terms of already-existing works. These
industries, and a number of prominent scholars, claim that when works enter the public
domain, bad things will happen to them. They worry that works in the public domain will be
underused, overused, or tarnished in ways that will undermine the works' economic and

cultural value. Although the validity of their assertions turns on empirically testable
hypotheses, very little effort has been made to study them.
This Article attempts to fill that gap by studying the market for audiobook recordings of
bestselling novels, a multi-million dollar industry. Data from this study, which includes a
novel human-subjects experiment, suggest that term-extension proponents' claims about the
public domain are suspect. Audiobooks made from public domain bestsellers (1913-22) are
significantly more available than those made from copyrighted bestsellers (1923-32). In
addition, the experimental evidence suggests that professionally made recordings of public
domain and copyrighted books are of similar quality. Finally, while a low quality recording
seems to lower a listener's valuation of the underlying work, the data do not suggest any
correlation between that valuation and the legal status of the underlying work. Accordingly,
this research indicates that the significant costs of additional copyright protection for
already-existing works may not be justified. These findings will be relevant to the inevitable
congressional and judicial debate over copyright term extension in the next few years.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

In 2018, for the first time in two decades, copyrighted works of art,
music, film, and literature are scheduled to enter the public domain. This
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promises to be a huge boon to both the public, who will be able to access
these works freely, and to creative artists, who wish to perform, adapt, copy,
or otherwise make use of them. Of course, to the owners of some of these
copyrighted works, their transition into the public domain means the loss of
millions of dollars of revenue. Book publishers and movie studios will face a
world where their creations are available for unauthorized copying and
adaptation by anyone. 2 It seems inevitable that, just as they did in the 1990s,
the copyright industries will engage in another round of congressional
lobbying to extend the term of protection for an additional period.
The standard justification for intellectual property ("IP") protection is
that the exclusive rights of copyright law provide incentives for creators to
invest in creating new works.3 Theoretically, without IP protection, creators
would not be able to recoup the costs of their investment if their creations
could be freely copied. The primary argument in favor of extending the
copyright term for future works is based on this incentive-to-create rationale:
a longer term means that the author will be able to generate more money
from her work, thereby increasing the ex ante incentive to create the work in
the first place.4
The incentive-to-create rationale fails entirely, however, in the case of
extending the copyright term for already existing books, music, and movies.
The extension of protection for The Sun Also Rises does not increase the
incentives for Hemingway to produce more or better work.5 He is, after all,
dead.6 Accordingly, proponents of term extension have had to offer other

1. The brief for the Petitioners in Eldred v. Ashcroft estimated these losses and noted
that "because of CTEA [Copyright Term Extension Act], the public will... have to pay an
additional $317 million annually in royalties." Brief for Petitioner, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), 2002 WL 1041928, at *7.
2. Trademark law will provide Disney some relief against unauthorized uses, such as
third-party production of a Mickey Mouse doll, that are likely to confuse consumers as to the
source of goods or services. See 15 U.S.C. 5 1125(a) (2011).
3. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 1 (2003).

4. Id. at 212.
5. Some argue that a potential author today seeing an extension of Hemingway's
copyright will perceive a signal that Congress will give the potential author's works similarly
gracious treatment in the future, thereby stimulating the potential author to produce more
now. With the present copyright term already at life-of-the-author plus seventy years, the
"added incentive" argument has not been taken very seriously. See Lawrence B. Solum,
Congress's Power to Promote the Progress of Sience: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 77
(2002).
6. Hemingway Dead of Shotgun Wound; Wife Says He Was Cleaning Weapon, N.Y. TIMES,

July 3, 1961, at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/books/99/07/04/specials/
hemingway-obit.html.
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reasons why longer copyrights will increase social welfare. During the
adoption of the last copyright term extension legislation and the litigation
surrounding it, the copyright industries and some leading scholars asserted
three justifications for increasing the term of protection for already existing
works.7
First, proponents of term extension have argued that, without additional
protection, the publishing industries will not have sufficient incentives to
preserve, protect, and commercialize old works. They claim that without the
protections that copyright provides, works that fall into the public domain
will be underused.8 This is a version of the classic "public goods" problem in
economics that asserts some intangible goods will be under-provided if their
producers lack the power to exclude unauthorized users.9 Second, and in
some ways the inverse of the first argument, proponents of term extension
claim that freely available works will be overused, thereby undermining the
works' economic and cultural value.' ° This is a version of the "tragedy of the
commons"" (e.g., once anybody can use "Rhapsody in Blue" in a movie or a
commercial, the song will be overused and lose its appeal). The proponents'
third argument claims that uncontrolled uses of culturally valuable works will
tarnish or debase those works, because poorly made or "inappropriate"
versions of the works will affect the public's judgments about the works'
quality and meaning and therefore their underlying value. 2 Audiences who
see a substandard production of Eugene O'Neill's The Iceman Cometb
performed by the Evans Elementary School Drama Club may not wish to
read the play or see another performance of it afterward, and thereby never
fully grasp the play's treatment of anarchy and socialism. As with the
incentive-to-create rationale for new works, these three justifications for
extending the term of protection for already existing works have a theoretical

appeal. The important question, however, is whether these justifications
stand up to empirical scrutiny. This Article attempts to answer that question.
In recent years, legal scholars have turned increasingly to empirical and
experimental methods to test longstanding assumptions about how laws
operate. These methods have been particularly successful when applied to IP
7. See infra notes 25-31.
8. See infra notes 25-31.
9. Theodore Groves & John Ledyard, OptimalAllocaion of Public Goods: A Solution to the
'Free Rider" Problem, 45 ECONOMETRICA 783 (1977).
10. See infra notes 25-31.
11. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 ScI. 1243 (1968).
12. See Justin Hughes, 'Recoding" Intellectual Propery and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77
TEx. L. REv. 923, 926 (1999) ("[N]on-owners commonly benefit from owner control that is
used to keep a cultural object 'stable.' ").
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law, because, unlike some areas of the law, IP law's assumptions about
markets, incentives, and human behavior are explicit. 13 This Article continues
the Authors' previous research applying empirical and experimental methods
to IP issues. It reports data from two studies that test the validity of
proponents' arguments for extending the copyright term. In short, our study

finds almost no evidence to support the claims made infavor of copyright term extension.
Part II describes the debate over copyright term extension and the
rationales in favor of it. This Part examines how these rationales affected the
last term-extension act and the litigation following it, and how such rationales
will likely come up again in renewed calls for extension. Part III reports on
empirical tests of the extension rationales. These tests rely on an interesting
and understudied creative industry: the market for audiobook recordings of
novels. Audiobooks are "derivative works" within the definition of copyright
law, 4 and they present a number of opportunities for studying claims about
the exploitation and commercialization of works. Our data compare the
markets for audiobook recordings of popular novels on either side of the
public domain divide: the decade of public domain works from 1913 to 1922
and the decade of copyrighted works from 1923 to 1932. Part IV applies the
empirical findings to the debate about copyright term extension. Although

13. See Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativioy Effect, 78 U.
CHI. L. REv. 31 (2011) [hereinafter Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativi~y Effect]; Christopher
Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing IntellectualProperty:An Experiment, 96 CORNELL
L. REV. 1 (2010); Deborah R. Gerhardt, Copyright Publication:An Empirical Study, 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 135 (2011); Paul J. Heald, Propertj Ri'ghts and the Efficient Exploitation of
Copyrighted Works: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Public Domain and Copyrighted Fiction Bestsellers, 92
MINN. L. REv. 1031, 1046-50 (2008) [hereinafter Heald, FictionBestsellers]; Paul J. Heald, Does
the Song Remain the Same? An Empirical Study of Bestselling Musical Compositions (1913-32) and
Their Use in Cinema (1968-2007), 60 CASE. W. RES. L. REv. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Heald,
Musical Compositions] (songs are just as likely to be used in films after they fall into the public
domain); Paul J. Heald & Robert Brauneis, The Myth f Buick Aspirin: An Empirical Study of
Trademark Dilution by Product and Trade Names, 32 CARDOzO L. REv. 2533 (2011); Raymond
Shih Ray Ku et al., Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An EmpiricalAnalysis of Copynight's
Bounty, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1669 (2009); Thomas R. Lee et al., An Empirical and Consumer
PsychologyAnalysis of Trademark Distinctiveness, 41 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1033 (2009).
14. The Copyright Act defines a derivative work as follows:
[A] work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation,
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or
any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A
work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other
modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship,
is a "derivative work".
17 U.S.C. 5 101 (2011).

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28:1

this research is in no way conclusive on the issue, it strongly suggests that all
three arguments in favor of copyright term extension are mistaken.
II.

THE COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION DEBATE

The primary salience of the data analyzed in Part II relates to the ongoing
and vociferous debate over the retroactive extension of copyright protection
to existing creative works. Fifteen years ago powerful players in the copyright
industries (primarily film, music, and book publishing) lobbied extensively to
encourage Congress to pass legislation to prevent their works from falling
into the public domain. 5 Following the success of those efforts in the United
States, the copyright industries have pushed for term extensions
internationally. 6 This Part briefly charts the history of the lobbying efforts in
both the United States and abroad. It then presents the three primary
economic justifications offered in favor of copyright term extension, all of
which assert that bad things happen when works fall into the public domain.
The data presented in Part III tend to refute the attempts prominent
economists and the copyright industries have made to justify extending the
term of protection to existing works.
A.

1998 SONNY BONO COPYRIGHT TERM
EXTENSION ACT AND LOOKING AHEAD TO 2018

THE UNITED STATES: THE

The U.S. Constitution provides Congress with the power to "promote
the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."'" In 1790, one year after the Constitution went into effect,
Congress passed the first copyright statute, providing protection for maps,
charts, and books) 8 This first Act provided authors with a fourteen-year term
of protection that could be renewed for an additional fourteen years. 9 Since
the eighteenth century, Congress has extended the copyright term for
existing works several times. In 1831, Congress extended the initial term of
protection to twenty-eight years with a fourteen-year renewal term,20 and the
1909 Copyright Act extended the renewal term to twenty-eight years.2'

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra notes 17-26.
See infra notes 33-40.
U.S. CONST. art. 1,5 8, cl. 8.
SeeAct of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831).
Id.
See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (repealed 1870).
See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976).
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The last major revision of the copyright statute, the 1976 Act, further
lengthened the period of copyright protection. 2 For existing works that had
not yet entered the public domain, the Act added forty-seven years of
protection to the twenty-eight-year term resulting in a total of seventy-five
years of protection. The Act, which went into effect in 1978, did not
retroactively revive copyright protection for works that had already entered
the public domain; consequentially, all works published prior to 1923 remain
in the public domain. The oldest works still subject to copyright were those
published in 1923, and their copyrights were set to expire at the end of 1998.
The possibility of these valuable works falling into the public domain seemed
disastrous to the copyright owners, who turned to Congress for another
extension.
By the time Americans had begun to debate the merits of another
copyright term extension, Congress had already passed legislation doing so.
The 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act ("CTEA") added an
additional twenty years of protection to the copyright term for all existing
works. 23 Works created between 1923 and 1978 now receive ninety-five years
of protection, while works created since 1978 would be protected for the
duration of the lives of their authors plus seventy years, with anonymous
works, pseudonymous works, and works made for hire receiving a defined
ninety-five-year term of protection.24
The intense, well-documented lobbying efforts of Disney2 5 and other
copyright owners 26 resulted in the passage by voice vote of the CTEA. 21 In

22. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
23. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.

2827 (1998).
24. 17 U.S.C. § 302-304 (2011).
25. See Bill McAllister, A Capital Way to Stop a Headache, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1998, at
A21 ("Hill staff members said that other Disney representatives, along with other movie
industry representatives, had made strong pleas for a 20-year extension to all copyrights."),
availableat http://www.public.asu.edu/-dkariala/commentary/WashPostl 0-1 5-98.html.
26. See John L. Fialka, Songwriters' Heirs Mourn Copyrigbt Loss, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1997,
at B1, available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=-5NGAAAAIBAJ&sjid=Dvg
MAAAAIBAJ&dq=songwriters-heirs-mourn-copyright-loss&pg=5468%2C3903721.
27. See Keith Pocaro, Private Ordering and Ophan Works: Our Least Worst Hope?, 2010
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 15, 15 (2010) ("The current state of copyright law, with wildly longer
term limits and automatic protection, is a result of continuous content-industry lobbying to
protect their valuable, aging intellectual property."); Alan K. Ota, Disney in Washington: The
Mouse That Roared, CQ WEEKLY, Aug. 8, 1998, available at http://wwv.cnn.com/
ALLPOLITICS/1998/08/10/cq/disney.html (describing the Disney lobbying strategy);
Dennis

Karjala,

OPPOSING

COPYRIGHT

EXTENSION

http://homepages.law.asu.edu/-dkaala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/
related to term extension efforts).

(Jan.

23,

2012),

(collecting documents
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fact, Disney Chairman Michael Eisner lobbied Senate Majority Leader Trent
Lott directly. 28 The bill sailed through both houses, with eighteen of twentyfive sponsors receiving Disney money, including Lott on the very day he
signed up as a co-sponsor.29 Opponents to term extension had very little
opportunity to participate in discussion of the bill; according to Professor
Dennis Karjala:
The hearings [on term extension] were combined with some other
bills, so they were not publicized under the bill numbers for those
trying to follow the legislation. The proponents of extensionsurprise, surprise!-knew about the House hearings and of course
testified in favor. The opponents did30 not even know the hearings
took place until several months later!
With significant royalty streams at stake, 3 1 copyright owners and the sponsors
of their bill were taking no chances on a full-blown debate over the wisdom
of extending the term of protection for valuable works that were about to fall
into the public domain.
The failure of Congress to seriously consider arguments that term
extension was a hidden tax on consumers, a drag on follow-on creators, and
an unconstitutional failure to "promote the Progress of Science"32 suggests
that any rationale offered in the legislative history of CTEA was merely

28. See Disney Lobbying for Term Extension No Mickey Mouse Effort, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 17,
1998, at 22.
29. See id.; see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 16 (2004) (noting that the Center for

Responsive Politics showed that in 1996 media interests donated $1.5 million to six of the
sponsors of the Copyright Term Extension Act); John Solomon, Rhapsody in Green, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 3, 1999, at E2. John Solomon wrote:
Behind the scenes, however, [Disney] has been active. Congressional
Quarterly reported that Disney chairman Michael Eisner personally
lobbied Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, a Republican from Mississippi.
That day, according to the Center for Responsive Politics, Disney gave
Lott a $1,000 contribution, following up two weeks later with a $20,000
donation to the National Republican Senatorial Committee.
Id.
30. Dennis Karjala, About Copyright Term Extension, OPPOSING COPYRIGHT
EXTENSION,

http://homepages.law.asu.edu/-dkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/

what.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2012).
31. See Marvin Ammori, The Uneasy Casefor Copyright Extension, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
287, 292 (2002) (noting that Disney in particular stood to lose control of billions of dollars'
worth of copyrights-Mickey Mouse and Winnie-the-Pooh alone were valued at nearly $8
billion dollars in revenue each-if the CTEA was not passed).
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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make-weight. 33 Nonetheless, the House Report stated that retroactive
extension would "provide copyright owners generally with the incentive to
restore older works and further disseminate them to the public." 34 In the
brief debate over the legislation, Representative Howard Coble adopted this
rationale and stated that "[w]hen works are protected by copyright, they
attract investors who can exploit the work for profit. ' 35 Bruce Lehman,
former Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, put the case most strongly
in his statement before Congress:
[]here is ample evidence that shows that once a work falls into the
public domain it is neither cheaper nor more widely available than
most works protected by copyright. One reason quality copies of
public domain works are not widely available may be because
publishers will not publish a work that is in the public domain for
fear that they 36
will not be able to recoup their investment or earn
enough profit.
Whether worries over the lack of availability of older works actually
motivated Congress or not, the Supreme Court picked up on the argument in

the failed constitutional challenge to the CTEA in Eldred v. Ashcroft. The
Court found that Congress "rationally credited projections that longer terms
would encourage copyright holders to invest in ...public distribution of
their works."3 8 The Eldred litigation forced copyright owners to articulate
neutral, public interest rationales to justify retroactively protecting copyrights
in existing works. The primary arguments defending term extension enlarged
upon the brief statements in the legislative history-that works would be less
available to the public if they fell into the public domain.
The lobbying effort for term extension in the late 1990s began as an
ordinary-and wildly successful-plea to Congress to maintain the flow of
various copyright-fueled income streams without serious consideration of
issues involving the public domain. The debate that peaked in Eldred five
33. See generally Dennis Karjala, Value of the Public Domain, OPPOSING COPYRIGHT
EXTENSION, http://homepages.law.asu.edu/-dkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/public
domain.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2012).
34. H.R. REP. NO. 105-452, at 4 (1998).
35. 144 CONG. REC. H1458 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1998) (statement of Rep. Howard
Coble).
36. Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislalion: Hearing on H.R 989,
H.R 1248, and H.RK 1734 Before the Subcomm. on Courtsand IntellectualProperty of the H. Comm. on
theJudiciay, 104th Cong. 217-18 (1995) (statement of Bruce Lehman, Assistant Secretary of
Commerce and Commisioner of Patents and Trademarks).
37. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
38. See id. at 207; see also Lawrence B. Solum, The Future of Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1137, 1165-68 (2005).
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years later had evolved into a full frontal assault on the public domain by
copyright owners. In need of a public interest rationale to defend their
monetary objectives, rights holders argued that myriad bad things would
happen if works were allowed to fall into the public domain,39 and thus they
asserted term extension was necessary to protect the public interest.
Because the present copyright term extension expires in 2018, Congress
will soon decide whether to acquiesce to the next round of lobbying by
copyright owners.4 ° In the meantime, other jurisdictions are actively
considering U.S.-style term extension. With significant royalty streams at
stake in other jurisdictions, the pro-extension lobbying effort has gone
global, with mixed success.
B.

INTERNATIONAL LOBBYING EFFORTS

U.S. copyright owners, whose interests are well represented by U.S. trade
negotiators, have also poured considerable effort and money into securing
term extensions in other countries. These copyright owners have already
been successful in imposing term extension on Australia as part of the
Australia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.41 Japan 42 is currently under similarly
intense pressure, as are Jamaica43 and other developing countries.44 The

39. See, e.g., Scott M. Martin, The Mythology of The Public Domain: Exploring The Myths
BehindAttacks on the Durationof Copyright Protection, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 253 (2002).
40. Joseph P. Liu has already looked ahead to 2018 in his recent article. See Joseph P.
Liu, The New Public Domain (Sept. 12, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1926381.
41. See Matthew Rimmer, Robbery Under Arms: Copyright Law and the Australia-United
States Free Trade Agreement, 11
FIRST MONDAY,
NO. 3 (Mar. 6, 2006),
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1316/1236 ("In
the trade negotiations, [the U.S. Trade Representative] demanded that Australia ratify the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and Performances and
Phonograms Treaty. He supported an extension of the copyright term, so that Australia
adopted the standards set by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act.") (emphasis
removed); see also Maree Sainsbury, Governance and the Process of Law Reform: The Copyright Term
Extension in Australia, 9 CANBERRA L. REv. 1 (2006) (detailing lobbying effort in Australia to
ratify the Free Trade Agreement).
42. See Mike Masnick, CopyrightExtension Moves to Japan, TECHDIRT (Nov. 20, 2009, 7:15
AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20091119/1840217016.shtml; CPB Netherlands
Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, Copyright Protection;Not More But Different (The Hague,
Working Paper No. 122, 2000), available at http://www.cpb.nl/en/publication/copyrightprotection-not-more-different (describing an industry "call for additional copyright
legislation and enforcement" in the Netherlands).
43. See Mike Masnick, Jamaicathe Latest to Embrace Retroactive Term Extension and Screw the
Public Domain, TECHDIRT (Oct. 21, 2011, 4:59 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20111014/00471816347/jamaica-latest-to-embrace-retroactive-copyright-term-extensionscrew-public-domain.shtml.
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European Union recently acceded to retroactive extension for sound
recordings," as has Argentina.46 A leaked first draft of the proposed
Transpacific Partnership between New Zealand, Japan, and Canada would
require retroactive extension for all copyrighted works.4 7 But other
jurisdictions have not been so easy to convince. Although pressure is
49
48
constant from the copyright lobby, both the United Kingdom and Japan
have refused to extend the term of protection for existing works other than
sound recordings. One major political party in Brazil has even proposed a
reduction in the copyright term. °
The United Kingdom seems particularly reluctant to adopt the proposed
changes in the absence of supporting empirical data. In fact, the recent
government report by Ian Hargreaves urges that
the IP System [be] driven as far as possible by objective evidence.
Policy should balance measurable economic objectives against

social goals and potential benefits for rights holders against impacts
on consumers and other interests. These concerns will be of

44. See Andrew Rens & Lawrence Lessig, Forever Minus A Day: A Consideration Of
Copyright Term Extension In South Africa, 7 S. AFR. J. INFO. & COMM. 22 (2006); MexicoCopyright Law Amended, LADAS & PARRY LLP (Mar. 21, 2004), http://www.ladas.com/

BULLETINS/2004/0304Bulletin/MexicoCopyrightLaw.html.
45. See Martin Kretschmer, Creativity Stifled? A Joined Academic Statement on the Proposed
Copyright Term Extensionfor Sound Recordings, 9 EUR. INTEL. PROP. REV. 314 (2008) (statement

of sixty-one law professors opposing extension).
46. Mike Masnick, Here We Go Again: Argentina Extends Copyright, TECHDIRT (Dec. 22,
2009, 5:27 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20091221/1756577455.shtml.
47. See Michael Geist, TPP Copyight Extension Would Keep Some of Canada's Top Authors
Out of Public Domain

For Decades, MICHAEL

GEIST'S

BLOG

(Jan.

9,

2012),

http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/6226/125/.
48. See ANDREW GOwERS, GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 56-57

(2006), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/6/E/pbrO6_gowers-report_
755.pdf (study commissioned by the British Treasury department rejecting ex post
justifications for extending copyright protection for existing works).
49. See Mike Masnick, Coptight Extension Moves to Japan,TECHDIRT (Nov. 29, 2009, 7:15
AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20091119/1840217016.shtml (reporting on efforts
to extend copyright in Japan); Andreas Bovens, Japan to Extend Posthumous Copyrght Term to 70
Years?, CHOSAQ, (July 24, 2006), http://chosaq.net/archives/2006/07/japan-to-extend-

posthumous-copyright-term-to-70-years.html.
50. No National Leeway? Copyight Reform Proposals in Bra!il and the Czech Republic,
GOVERNANCE ACROSS BORDERS (Sept. 3, 2010) http://govemancexborders.com/2010/09/
03/no-national-leeway-copyright-reform-proposals-in-brazil-and-the-czech-republic/#mre1095.
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particular importance in assessing future claims to extend rights or
in determining desirable limits to rights.5'
Consistent with the Hargreaves approach, the earlier commissioned Gowers

Review of Intellectual Propery examined existing empirical evidence and rejected
arguments that retroactive term extension was necessary. 2 Although the
United Kingdom had no choice but to accede to the new E.U. directive
retroactively extending protection to sound recordings, 3 the level of
4
skepticism from U.K. officials was significant.1
The debate over the economic wisdom of term extension around the
world turns on the validity of the same factual assumptions asserted to justify
term extension in the United States."5 Before explaining how our data bear
on the validity of those assumptions, we provide a fuller account of the proextension arguments below.
C.

ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATIONS OF TERM EXTENSION: TESTABLE
HYPOTHESES

Jack Valenti, the President of the Motion Picture Association of America,
once testified derisively to Congress that public domain works were
"orphan[s],"" * meaning that without parents (owners) they would be subject

51. IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND GROWTH 20 (2011), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreviewfinalreport.pdf.
52. See GowERs, supra note 48, at 56-57.
53. See Directive 2011/77/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
September 2011 amending Directive 2006/116/EC on the term of protection of copyright
and certain related rights, 2011 O.J. (L 265) 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:265:0001:0005:en:pdf.
54. See Commission Staff Working Document- Impact Assessment on the Legal and Economic
Situation of Performersand Record Producers in the European Union, COM (2008) 464 final (Apr. 23,
2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/copyright/docs/term/iaterm-en.pdf
(analyzing EU proposal to extend copyright term in sound recordings from fifty to ninetyfive years); Eric Bangeman, U.K Government Resists Music Industr Pressure,Caps Copyrights at 50
Years,

ARS

TECHNICA

(July

24,

2007,

8:59

AM),

http://arstechnica.com/tech-

policy/news/2007/07/uk-govemment-resists-music-industry-pressure-caps-copyights-at-50years.ars.
55. See Laura Bradford, A Closer Look at the PublicDomain, 13 GREEN BAG 343, 344-45
(2010) ("Currendy a debate exists globally about the scope of protections for IP....
Proponents of the current strong rules protecting intellectual property argue that a failure to
reward innovation curtails investment."); K.retschmer, supra note 45.
56. See Copyrigbt Term, Film Labeling and Film Preservation Legislation: Heating on Copyright
Term Extension, H.R. 989 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and IntellectualPropely of the H. Comm. on
the Judiday, 104th Cong. 55 (1995) (statement of Jack Valenti, President and CEO, Motion
Picture Association of America).
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to distressing abuse. Sophisticated commentators in support of copyright
term extension have offered more detailed and theory-driven arguments in
support of their position. These arguments fall into three categories:
underuse, overuse, and tarnishment. All three primary arguments rely on
factual assertions about what happens when works fall into the public
domain. Our study of the market for audiobooks, discussed in Part III, infra,
tests all three assertions.
1.

The Underuse Hypothesis

The most prominent justification for term extension asserts that works
become less available to consumers when they fall into the public domain. In
their influential article arguing for indefinitely renewable copyright for
valuable works, law and economics scholars William Landes and Richard
Posner reason that "an absence of copyright protection for intangible works
may lead to inefficiencies because of impaired incentives to invest in
maintaining and exploiting these works."5" Landes and Posner's argument is a
version of the classic "public goods" problem in economics. IP is expensive
to create, but once it has been created, it can be cheaply copied and used by
others. Because creators of IP cannot easily exclude others from using it,
theory implies that they will not be able to recoup their investment costs and

will never engage in creating the work in the first place. Thus, the law has to
step in to create legal boundaries allowing creators the chance to recover
their investments.5 9

This argument can be applied not only to new works but to already
created works as well. Some works require costly investments to maintain,
produce, and distribute them over time. For example, when audio formats
changed, someone had to spend money to transfer recordings on old vinyl
disks to a digital format or the old music would not be accessible to most
listeners. In theory, because those who would invest resources in the
conversion cannot prevent others from free riding on their efforts, they will
57. On the role of metaphors in copyright law, see WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS
AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 44 (2009). Regarding orphan works, Patry writes: "Use of the

term 'orphan' inaccurately conjures up an emotional need to protect these works against
those who would use them with the copyright owner's permission, even though the 'parents'
long ago dropped any interest in them." Id.at 77.
58. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI.
L. REV. 471, 475 (2003); see also LIOR ZEMER, THE IDEA OF AUTHORSHIP IN COPYRIGHT

(2007) (arguing for indefinitely renewable copyright based on five-year renewal terms).
59. Another commentator explains: "If [works enter] the public domain, they [become]
obscure and thus no one [will] invest in them due to the problem of free riding. Items which
retain enough value for future use should be given indefinite copyrights to maintain their
value." Miriam Bitton, ModerniingCopyrightLaw, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 65, 77 (2011).
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not be able to recoup their investment and, thus, will never bother to invest

in the first place. Although this appears not to be the case with digital
recordings,6 ° without a method for recouping the cost of conversion,
preservation, or reproduction, the underuse hypothesis maintains that
commercializers will have inadequate incentives to continue production and
distribution of older works. This was the primary worry that Congress
expressed when passing CTEA in 1998.61
Professor Arthur Miller adds a related concern about the underuse of
copyrighted works. He worries that new works deriving from and based on
materials in the public domain would be under-produced.6 2 Copyright law
gives owners the exclusive right to make or license derivative works like
adaptations, sequels, and translations that are based on the original work.6"
Miller argues that these derivative works will not be made without longer
copyright terms.64 He reasons that "you have to provide incentives for
[producers] to produce the derivatives, the motion picture, the TV series, the
documentary, whatever it may be-perhaps even a musical! ... We must

incentivize the dissemination industries, the preservation industries, and the
derivative work industries."6 According to Miller's argument, without the
ability to prevent copiers, no one will be willing to invest the resources in
creating a musical version of A Passage to India, because, if it proved
successful, others would be able to prepare their own musicals of the book.
These competing versions would drive down the value of the first musical,
thereby undermining the incentives to create it in the first place. A staunch
advocate of term extension, Miller believes that works need owners in order
to be adequately exploited in derivative forms.66

60. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.

61. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-452, at 4 (1998).
62. Symposium, The Constitutionalityof Copyright Term Extension: How Long is Too Long?, 18
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 693 (2000) (panel comments of Arthur Miller).
61. 17 O.S.C. § 106(2) (2011).
64. The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long is Too Long?, supra note 62,
at 693.
65. Id.; cf Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REv. 907, 919
(2004) ("The tendency towards overgrazing could thus reinforce one towards
underinvestment, leading to a commons featuring too few, and too intensively exploited,
intellectual products-at least in the absence of legal rules or norms designed to cabin these
tendencies.").
66. See The Constitutionaliy of Copyright Term Extension: How Long is Too Long?, supra note
62, at 692-94.
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2. The Overuse Hypothesis
The "tragedy of the commons," whereby common ownership leads to
the degradation of a shared resource, forms the basis of the second primary
theoretical justification for copyright term extension.67 The tragedy of the
commons can occur when a group of people collectively owns some
resource, like a pasture. Each person has the incentive to maximize his use of
the pasture before others can do so. This leads to overuse and depletion of
the pasture through overgrazing. Similarly, if no one has the exclusive right
to a creative work, then it might be overused (imagine dozens of advertisers
all using the same song).68 In such situations, the typical economic solution is
to assign individual ownership of the resource so that a single control
structure can efficiendy manage use. 69
Landes and Posner make the tragedy of the commons analogy to
copyright term extension explicit: "a novel or a movie or a comic book
character or a piece of music or a painting" could be depleted like "unlimited
drilling from a common pool of oil or gas would deplete the pool
prematurely."7 Similarly, Stan Liebowitz and Stephan Margolis conclude:
Firms producing copies or derivatives of creative works after the
copyright expires may be in the position of fisherman [sic] on an
open access lake. They produce at their own private optima, not
taking into account the effects that they have on other producers.
Ownership can effectively manage
these interactions, and
71
copyright provides that ownership.

67. See Hardin, supra note 11.
68. At least one commentator asserts that this was the fate of the classic film It's a
Wonderful iDfe
before it was rescued from the public domain. See Scott M. Martin, The

Mythology of the Public Domain: Exploring the Myths Behind Attacks on the Durain of Copyright
Protection,36 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 253, 274-75 (2002). Martin explained:
By the 1980s, there were multiple versions of [It's a Wondeful lfe], all in
horrid condition. The film was "often sliced and diced by local stations
who stuffed it with commercials." There was no quality control over
home video copies of the film-consumers had no way of knowing
whether the tape they were purchasing was a poor quality bootleg version
(which most were).
Id. (citations omitted).
69. See Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg,

ConstructingCommons in the CulturalEnvironment,95 CORNELL L. REV. 657 (2010).
70. Landes & Posner, supra note 58, at 487.
71. Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis, Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh in on
Copyright: The Role of Theory, Empirics, and Network Effects, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 435, 451
(2005).
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In other words, without owners to police the frequency with which a work is
used, others may wear it out and reduce its value.
The overuse hypothesis rests on the assumption that the value of creative
works, like the value of a pasture, is finite and exhaustible.72 Each work has
an optimal level at which it should be exploited and each use beyond that
level decreases the work's value to others. While an individual owner of the
copyright has the incentive to maintain the value of a work over time by
preventing it from being overused, once the work falls into the public
domain, others will rush to exploit the work's value immediately.7 3 According
to this theory a creative work such as a song has increasing social and
economic value up to a certain number of uses in a given time period (e.g., in
commercials during a year). Once that usage level is met, however, its value
diminishes. Individual copyright owners are incentivized to exploit their
works at the socially optimal maximum, but if works fall into the public
domain, others will overuse the works and diminish their value.74
3. The TarnishmentHypothesis

The third rationale for extending copyright protection to already existing
works is based on the fear that creative works will lose their value not
through overuse but through misuse or tarnishment. A number of
commentators have expressed concern that inappropriate uses of works will
debase them and reduce their value.7" Karjala, a leading opponent of term

72. The overuse hypothesis also assumes that people will exploit the resource in such a
way that its value will be diminished. But considerable social science evidence, including
from the field of behavioral game theory, demonstrates that this kind of overexploitation
does not always take place. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION Games E. Alt & Douglass C.
North eds., 1990).
73. Of course, the assumption that creative works have finite and exhaustible value is
itself open to empirical testing and may, in fact, be false. Psychological studies suggest that
repeated exposure to things may actually increase their attractiveness. See Robert B. Zajonc,
Ah'itudinal Effects Of Mere Exposure, 9 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPH
SUPPLEMENT 1, 23 (1968).

74. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 355
(1967).
75. See Michael Steven Green, Copyrighting Facts, 78 IND. L.J. 919, 925 (2003). Green
argues:
In addition to encouraging authors to create new works, copyrights also
encourage authors to efficiently utilize constituents of works that already
exist. For example, if no one had a property right in the character
Superman, authors could freely create works in which Superman appeared
as a character without concern for the effect their works had on the value
of actual and potential Superman-based works.
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extension, has coined a phrase to explain what is allegedly lacking when a
work falls into the public domain: "proper husbandry by the copyright
owner." 76 The idea behind this hypothesis is that creative works can lose their
value not just through overuse but also through the wrong kinds of uses.
While the creation of some kinds of derivative works from an original work
will be valuable and increase social welfare, other kinds of derivative works
will actually decrease the value of the original and harm social welfare.
The most commonly expressed concern here involves the specter of
unauthorized pornographic use that dots the literature on the subject.77 As
Karjala notes, "Rowling, Disney and other creative authors have at least
some justification for being outraged when their characters are used in
contexts wholly different from the original, such as pornography ... ,,78 If
viewers see a pornographic poster of Harry Potter, for example, they may tend
to dislike and avoid the original movie. Presumably, though, other uses of the
original work could harm it through the feedback effects of an audience's
reaction to the low quality derivative work as well. As noted above, poor
quality productions of plays could undermine people's sense of the value of
the drama and its author. Or a poor movie version of a novel might reduce
the public's interest in the book. Hence, the asserted need for "proper
husbandry," and thus continued ownership of the work.
III.

EMPIRICALLY TESTING THE ECONOMIC
ASSUMPTIONS: THE CASE OF AUDIOBOOKS

Several years ago Professors Liebowitz and Margolis provided an
invitation that the present study accepts:
There are, of course, many expensive derivative works that are
based upon creations entirely in the public domain. The question is
whether they are produced as regularly or as well as they would be
Id.; see also Alex Kozinski, Mickey & Me, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 465, 469

(1994) (arguing that unauthorized uses "end up diminishing the value of the product, not
just to the creator, but to the general public as well'); Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 71, at
449 ("Malicious or offensive derivative uses of some creative works might seriously diminish
their value without a sufficient offset in the form of public benefit."). Cf Hughes, supra note
12, at 926 (arguing that "non-owners commonly benefit from owner control that is used to
keep a cultural object 'stable'").
76. Dennis S. Karjala, Hary Potter, Tanya Grotter, and the Copyright Derivative Work, 38
ARiz. ST. L.J. 17, 37 (2006).

77. See, e.g., Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 71, at 449 n.24 ("The existence of a
'Madeline Does Dallas' might lead to some awkward questions during bedtime stories.');
Heald, Musical Compositions, supra note 13, at 25 ("The entire debate seems to turn on the
effect of having unauthorized pom movies starring Mickey Mouse or Superman.").
78. Karjala, supra note 76, at 36.
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This is an empirical

question to which economists do not yet have the answer.79

The Article uses the audiobook market to answer both questions about the
quantity and quality of derivative works posed by these two prominent
economists.
Audiobooks-audio recordings of fiction and nonfiction books-have
become increasingly popular. Originally known as "books on tape," sales of
audiobooks have skyrocketed in recent years as technological changes in
storage capacity, accessibility, and the ubiquity of smart phones have made
listening to recorded versions of books incredibly convenient. The market
for audiobooks is estimated to take in $1 billion per year, and it is growing at
over 10% per year. 0 This growth has been led by more than 300% growth in
sales of downloaded audiobooks over a five-year period starting in 2005.1
Despite the significance of the audiobook market, no previous research has
studied it with an eye towards IP law.
This Part reports two empirical studies of the audiobook market that test
the economic assumptions supporting copyright term extension. Study 1
tests the underuse and overuse hypotheses by comparing the availability of
audiobook recordings of popular fiction works from the decades on either
side of the copyright-public domain divide. Study 2 applies a novel
experimental technique to test the misuse hypothesis. Before describing
those studies, Section III.A discusses some of the existing research that bears
on these questions.
A.

EXISTING EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION
AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

One of us has previously tracked the availability of 166 fiction bestsellers
from 1913 to 1922 while they were still in copyright and after they fell out of
copyright between 1988 and 1997.82 Heald measured the percentage of best
sellers in print and the average number of publishers per work in a given year
and found that, until 2001, public domain books were as available as their
copyrighted counterparts.83 After 2001, the percentage of in-print public
domain bestsellers was significantly higher, as was the number of publishers
79. Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 71, at 449.
80. See Industy Data, AUDIO PUBLISHERS ASS'N,

http://audiopub.org/resources-

industry-data.asp (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
81. Id The report also notes: "The CD format still represents the largest single source
of dollars but showed slight declines overall in 2010-58% of revenue (down from 65%)
and 43% of unit sales (down from 46/)." Id.
82. See Heald, Ficion Bestsellers, supra note 13, at 1039-43.
83. Seeid. at 1040-41.
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per work. By 2006, 98% of the public-domain bestsellers from 1913 to 1922
were in print compared to only 74% of the copyrighted bestsellers from 1923
to 1932.84 These data indicate that the fears about underuse may be inflated.
A second study, tracking the use of public domain songs in movies,
showed that public domain songs were exploited at a rate equal to that of
their copyrighted counterparts.8" Heald measured the rate at which songs
from 1913 to 1932 appeared in movies and accounted for the number of
moviegoers who attended each movie the year of its release. He found no
difference in the rates at which moviegoers were exposed to public domain
and copyrighted songs.86 Also, the study took on the overuse claim directly
and found that copyright owners were willing to license their songs for use in
movies at an equal or higher rate than public domain songs were used.87 In
other words, ownership did not function as a relative constraint on
comparative use rates in that market.
Finally, at the request of the Library of Congress, Tim Brooks studied the
rate at which copyright owners were making old vinyl audio recordings of
popular music available to the public. He found that non-owners had
converted more music from vinyl to digital format than copyright owners
had.88
B.

STUDY 1: THE EXPLOITATION OF POPULAR FICTION IN AUDIOBOOKS

While the research discussed above has cast doubt on the hypotheses
offered by some economists and proponents of term extension, the present
audiobook studies enable us to more directly ascertain what happens to
works when they fall into the public domain. Studying the audiobook market
suggests a number of distinct advantages. First, audiobooks constitute
derivative works under U.S. copyright law because they are transformations
of other copyrighted works.8 9 Many of the arguments concerning term
extension discuss the public domain's presumed ill effects on the production
of derivative works, so, unlike the research discussed above, this study can
84. Id. at 1040.
85. See Heald, Musical Compositions, supra note 13, at 10-12 (demonstrating songs in the
public domain were used in film once every 3.8 years while songs protected by copyright
were used in film once every 3.3 years, with little difference in the relative popularity of films
using public domain or copyrighted songs).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 14-15.
88. See TIM BROOKS, NAT'L RECORDING PRES. BD., LIBRARY OF CONG., SURVEY OF
REISSUES OF U.S. RECORDINGS 7-8 & 7 tbl. 4 (2005) (demonstrating that copyright owners

have made only an average of 14 % of popular recordings from 1890 to 1964 available on
CD, while non-owners have made 2 2 % of them available to the public on CD).
89. 17 U.S.C. 5 101 (2011).
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help explore the public domain's effect on different versions of the same
work. Second, derivative works require a capital investment to create, thus
studying audiobooks provides an opportunity to measure whether investors
are deterred from exploiting public domain works.
The market for audiobooks is distinctive in its heterogeneity. Many
audiobooks, of both public domain and copyrighted works, are produced at
significant expense by firms that use professional actors working on sound
stages. The production and distribution of these audiobooks may cost
thousands of dollars per book.9 ° With improvements in computing, however,
private individuals may also make their own audiobooks with nothing more
than a copy of the book, a computer, and some free software. For example,
the website Librivox.org collects, organizes, and distributes thousands of
privately recorded audiobooks produced by lay readers.91 The site encourages
members of the public to submit their own recordings of public domain
works; the Librivox staff then reviews the submissions to ensure accuracy
and comprehensibility. Librivox, however, makes no effort to judge the
92
quality of recordings or to limit its listings only to those of high quality.
Accordingly, while many of the audiobooks available on its website rival
professional recordings in quality, many others are quite poorly made. Study
2 takes advantage of this heterogeneity in audiobook quality to test the
hypothesis that low quality derivative works affect the value of the underlying
work.

90. Celebrity readers are often paid $4000 to $6000 for standard six-hour recordings.
See Why Celebriies are Lending Their Voices to Audiobooks, PUBLISHING CENTRAL
http://publishingcentral.com/artides/20061126-32-06e6.html?si=4 (last visited Nov. 4, 2012).
91. LIBRIVOX, http://www.librivox.org (last visited Nov. 4, 2012).
92. See hugh, Comment to COMPLETE FAQ - Everything You Need to Know (Almost),
LIBRIVOX (Nov. 13, 2005, 2:45 PM), https://forum.librivox.org/viewtopic.php?f=18
&t=219&sid=ce01d19d7a0c0bf3fc0d2fb30171548c. In response to the frequently asked
question, "Don't you have any standards?," user hugh stated:
Our feeling is this: in order for LibriVox to be successful we must
welcome anyone who wishes to honour a work of literature by lending
their voice to it. Some readers are better than others, and the quality of
reading will change from book to book and sometimes from chapter to
chapter. But we will not judge your reading, though we may give you
some advice if you ask for it. This is not Hollywood, and LibriVox has
nothing to do with commercial media's values, production or otherwise.
However: we think almost all of our readings are excellent, and we DO try
to catch technical problems (like repeated text etc.) with our Listeners
Wanted/prooflistening stage.
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1. Methods: Study 1
The underuse and overuse hypotheses make empirically testable
assertions about the availability of works once they enter the public domain.
These hypotheses assert that works will be either under-exploited or diluted,
respectively, after they lose copyright protection. Many works subject to
copyright, however, have no significant remaining value when they fall into
the public domain. Accordingly, the hypotheses are only relevant to those
works that have retained significant value at the time when they would enter
the public domain. Our study focuses on just these works.
Following the methodology used in one of the studies discussed above,93
we derived a list of bestselling novels that were published in the decade
before (1913-1922) and the decade after (1923-1932) the copyright-public
domain divide (i.e., all of the novels published between 1913 and 1922 have
entered the public domain, while all of those published in or after 1923 are
still subject to copyright protection).94 The list includes 171 public domain
novels and 174 copyrighted novels. 9 Our goal was to collect a sample of
fiction from the same period large enough to support statistically meaningful
analyses.
Of course, many books that were bestsellers when published may no
longer have significant value. Accordingly, we derived a second, smaller list
of novels that have shown enduring popularity. This list-generated by
examining the number of editions in print and consulting with experts in the
literature of the period 9 6-includes twenty public domain novels and twenty
copyrighted novels. 97 These books, like James Joyce's The Portraitof the Artist
as a Young Man (1916) and William Faulkner's The Sound and the Fug (1929),
are still widely read and retain significant cultural and economic value. This
Article refers to these novels as "durable."
To test the underuse and overuse hypotheses, we collected data on the
availability and prices of audiobook versions of all 375 works. We searched
the most widely used online retailers of audiobooks, Audible.com, 98

93. See Heald, Fiction Bestsellers, supra note 13.
94. We discarded a handful of post-1922 bestsellers that had not been renewed after
the expiration of their initial twenty-eight year copyright term. Such works fell into the
public domain and were not eligible for the 1976 or 1998 term extensions.
95. See infra Appendix A.
96. See Heald, Fiction Bestsellers, supra note 13, at 1038-39 (describing the selection
methodology for "durable" novels).
97. See infra Appendix B.
98. AUDIBLE.COM, www.audible.com (last visited Nov. 4, 2012). Audible.com is owned
and operated by Amazon. Id.
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Amazon,99 and Barnes and Noble, 10 0 all of which sell versions in either CD or
downloadable mp3 format. We also cross-referenced our results against the
online listing Books in Print,published by Bowker.'0' In addition to noting the
availability of tides, we computed the average prices of professional
recordings across the different retailers. Finally, using Librivox, we collected
data on the availability of free recordings of public domain novels.

2. Results: Study 1
A comparison of the full samples of 171 public domain novels and 174
copyrighted novels shows some similarities and some differences. Of the
public domain novels, 58 of the 171 tides (33%) have at least one available
recording. Of those, 17 only exist in a Librivox recording. There are a total of
193 complete recordings of the recorded works (67 on CD and 126 on mp3),
for an average of 3.3 recordings per recorded tide. For the 174 copyrighted
tides, 27 are available in audiobook format (16%). Of these, there are a total
of 80 complete recordings (44 on CD and 36 on mp3), for an average of 3.0
recordings per recorded tide. Interestingly, the average price for the available
recordings is fairly similar for public domain and copyrighted tides (Public
Domain: CD = $26, mp3 = $22; Copyrighted: CD = $28, mp3 = $19).
Table 1: Full Sample of Novels

Recordings

Recordings/
Recorded
Title

Avg.
Price
CD

Avg.
Price
mp3

33

193

3.3

$26

$22

16

80

3.0

$28

$19

# in
Sample

#
Recorded

%
Recorded

Public
Domain
Domain

171

58

Copyrighted

174

27

Total

For bestselling novels from 1913 to 1932, the data suggest that being in
the public domain roughly doubles the likelihood that the work will be
available in audiobook format. Despite this increase, however, the fact that a
work is in the public domain-and is thus free to be used without
licensing-does not ensure that it will be made into an audiobook. Including
the versions available on Librivox, fewer than half of the public domain tides
are available as audiobooks. Moreover, the similarity in prices between
professionally read public domain and copyrighted audiobooks at least
suggests that the public domain tides are not being produced in appreciably
lower quality versions.
99. AMAZON, www.amazon.com (last visited Nov. 4, 2012).
100.

BARNES

& NOBLE, www.bn.com (last visited Nov. 4, 2012).

101. See Bowker, BOOKS IN PRINT, www.booksinprint.com (last visited Nov. 4,2012).
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For the titles of enduring popularity, the story is similar. All of the twenty
public domain titles are currently available in an audiobook version, and
there are 6.25 recordings per title. Of the enduringly popular copyrighted
works, however, only 17 are currently available in audiobook format (85%),
and there are only 3.25 versions per recorded title. The data on pricing are
consistent with Heald's earlier study finding that the 20 copyrighted durable
books were significantly more expensive on a price-per-page basis than the
20 public domain durable books.10 2 This study concludes that durable
copyrighted audiobooks cost $0.050 per minute for CDs and $0.036 per
minute for mp3 downloads. The corresponding price for the durable public
domain audiobooks was significantly lower: $0.038 per minute for CDs and
$0.028 for mp3 downloads.
Table 2: Enduringly Popular Novels

#in
Sample

#
Recorded

%
Recorded

Tow
Recordings

Recordings/
Recorded
Title

Avg.
Price/
min.
CD

Avg.
Price/
min.
mp3

Public
Domin
Domain

20

20

100

134

6.25

$0.038

$0.028

Copyrighted

20

16

80

62

3.25

$0.050

S0.036

As with the full sample, being in the public domain increases the
likelihood that a work of enduring popularity will be available in audiobook
format, and it increases the number of recordings of the tide that are likely to
be available when compared to similar copyrighted works. For these works,
there is full exploitation of public domain novels in audiobook format. Part
IV, infra, analyzes whether the number of recordings per title constitutes
overexploitation.
C.

STUDY 2: AUDIOBOOK QUALITY AND TARNISHMENT

Study 2 addresses the tarnishment hypothesis put forward by economists
and proponents of copyright term extension. According to this hypothesis,
once works enter the public domain and are free to be used by anyone, the
works will be subjected to a variety of inappropriate and poor quality uses
that will undermine the works' cultural and economic value. Without
copyright ownership, so the argument goes, valuable works will not be
properly husbanded. This study focuses only on the durable works described
102. Heald, Fiction Bestsellers, supra note 13, at 1048-49.
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in Study 1. Using a novel experimental methodology, we tested: (1) whether
public domain works are produced in poorer quality audiobook versions than
versions
are copyrighted works, and (2) whether poorer quality audiobook
03
made.'
are
they
which
from
novels
the
of
value
perceived
the
affect
1. Methods: Study 2
To test these questions, we relied on the heterogeneity of available
audiobook recordings from multiple sources. As mentioned above,
audiobooks are available from both professional and amateur sources. If the
tarnishment hypothesis is correct, we would expect that: (1) the quality of
audiobook recordings of copyrighted works would be higher than that of
audiobooks based on public domain works (because the copyrighted works
have an owner to husband them); and (2) the lower quality of the public
domain audiobooks would be reflected in a lower perceived value of the
underlying novel.
To test these assumptions, we recruited subjects through Amazon
Mechanical Turk 4 to listen to selections of audiobook recordings and to
provide feedback on them. After agreeing to participate, the subjects were
directed to the survey instrument, hosted on a standard survey platform. 05
The subjects were told that the survey was being conducted by researchers
who were testing the quality of different people as potential audiobook
readers. The subjects were then presented with five alternating five-minute
recordings taken from the beginning of the fifth chapter of the selected
novels.0 6 After listening to each selection, the subjects were asked a series of
questions:
1. They were asked two comprehension questions to ensure that
they were paying attention.
readiness for
2. They were asked to rate the quality of the reader's
10 7
commercial distribution on a scale of one to six.
103. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
104. Amazon Mechanical Turk, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AmazonMechanicalTurk (last visited Nov. 9, 2012) ("The Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is a
crowdsourcing Internet marketplace that enables computer programmers (known as
Requesters) to coordinate the use of human intelligence to perform tasks that computers are
currently unable to do."); see also AMAZON MECHANiCAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com/
mturk/welcome (last visited Nov. 9, 2012).
105. QUALTRICS, www.qualtrics.com (last visited Nov. 9, 2012).
106. We selected the fifth chapter to avoid biases associated with particularly wellknown or interesting first chapters.
107. The points on the scale were labeled:
1) This reader could never produce a commercially acceptable audiobook.
2) With great improvement this reader could produce an acceptable audiobook.
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They were asked if they had read or seen other versions of the
work and, if so, how much they liked them.
4. After being told that the surveyors would have multiple
paperback copies of the book left over after completing the
survey, they were asked to indicate the price for which the
surveyors should sell the extra copies. They were instructed that
paperback copies typically sell for $8 to $12.1°8
Finally, after listening to the five different recordings, the subjects were asked
a series of questions about their own audiobook usage and demographic
background.
We chose the recordings from works on our list of the most enduringly
popular novels on either side of the copyright-public domain divide. The
sample recordings came from several different sources. Since at the time of
the study there were only sixteen professional recordings of the twenty most
durable copyrighted works, we selected all sixteen of them. In addition, we
randomly selected sixteen of the twenty professionally recorded public
domain audiobooks. Comparing the subjects' responses to these sets of
recordings enabled us to test whether the professional versions of the public
domain works were being produced at the same standards as professional
versions of the copyrighted works.
In addition, this study included versions of the works produced by
non-professionals. Accordingly, we selected recordings of the same sixteen
public domain works that are downloadable on the website Librivox. These
recordings had been made by private parties using their own equipment. Of
course, because the copyrighted works are still under copyright protection,
non-professional recordings of these works are not available publicly. To
complete the sample and to provide a control for the comparative
attractiveness of the content of all the underlying works, we employed a nonprofessional reader to record copies of the sixteen copyrighted works. This
ensured that particularly exciting or interesting prose did not bias the
evaluation of the reader.
This strategy gave us a 2 x 2 matrix of recordings (Legal Status:
Copyrighted vs. Public Domain; Source: Professional vs. Non-Professional).

3)
4)
5)
6)

This reader is close to good enough, but still needs some improvement.
The reader was acceptable for commercial distribution.
The reader was very good, clearly ready for commercial distribution.
The reader was excellent.
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Figure 1
LEGAL STATUS

Copyrighted

PublicDomain

0

2. Results. Study 2
Our data provide almost no support for the arguments made by
proponents of copyright term extension that, once works fall into the public
domain, the works will be produced in poor quality versions that will
undermine their cultural or economic value. 109 Our data indicate no
statistically significant difference, for example, between the listeners'
judgments of the quality of professional audiobook readers of copyrighted
and public domain texts. " Study 2 also found no significant difference
between the recommended prices for which the paperback copies should be
sold."' This suggests, as we discuss in more detail below, that the producers

109. In addition to the data reported here, we reran the study with a sample of subjects
recruited from the general population by Qualtrics. The results of that study are identical to
those reported here, and we chose to report the mTurk data because the quality of the
responses that we received were higher in the mTurk sample. The results are available online
at http://www.kentlaw.iit.edu/institutes-centers/center-for-empirical-studies-of-inteUectualproperty/cesip-projects/copyright-term-extension.
110. Two sample t test, p = 0.4452. To indicate a statistically significant difference, the
"p value" should be less than 0.05.
111. Two sample t test, p =0.9203.
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of professional audiobook recordings of public domain works are not using
poorer quality readers than are the producers of copyrighted works.
The data do reveal, however, that the amateur recordings of both
copyrighted and public domain works are perceived to be of lower quality
than are the professional versions." 2 Librivox recordings of public domain
works were perceived to be significantly worse than professional recordings
(3.54 versus 4.30, on a scale of 1 to 6, respectively)," 3 and the recordings of
our assistant were perceived to be significantly worse than professional
recordings of both copyrighted and public domain works." 4 This difference
is not surprising-the resources that go into professional recordings will tend
to be much greater than those that go into amateur recordings.
The important question, however, is whether the perceived difference in
quality between amateur and professional recordings resulted in
corresponding value judgments of the underlying work. The answer is a
qualified "no," but the data are not entirely unambiguous. In general, we
found a positive and statistically significant relationship between the
perceived quality of a recording and the amount for which subjects thought
copies should be sold. This is important for two reasons. First, it suggests
that our metric for studying the underlying value of a work (i.e., asking how
much we should sell copies for) is sensitive to changes in quality of the
recording and, thus, indicates the validity of the measure. Second, it suggests
that people who listen to poor quality recordings of audiobooks are likely to

attribute some of their dissatisfaction to the underlying work. Accordingly,
there appears to be some feedback effect between the quality of a given
version of a work and the value of the underlying work.
Table 3: Quality and Price of Recordings

Public Domain Professional
Copyright Professional
Public Domain Librivox
Copyright Research Asst.
Public Domain Research Asst.

Avg. Quality (1-6)
4.30
4.17
3.54
3.56

Avg. Price
$8.30
$8.26
$8.00
$8.40

3.55

$7.78

112. See infra Table 3.
113. Two sample t test, p = 0.0002.
114. Assistant vs. Copyrighted: two sample t test, p = 0.0027; Assistant vs. Public
Domain: two sample t test, p = 0.0001. We detected no significant difference between our
assistant's recordings of public domain works and his recordings of copyrighted works.
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Importantly, the correlation between recording quality and price did not
manifest itself in the manner predicted by proponents of copyright term
extension. The data indicated no statistically significant differences in book
price between any of the paired conditions.1 ' Thus, for example, although
the Librivox recordings of public domain works were judged to be of lower
quality than professional recordings of public domain works, we detected no
significant difference between the prices that subjects indicated for the
paperback books." 6 Moreover, although we detected a positive correlation
between quality and price for the entire sample of works, we found no such
correlation within any of the subsamples. These results suggest that although
there may be a modest feedback effect associated with poor quality versions
of creative works, that effect is not related to whether a work is protected by
copyright or not.
D.

DATA LIMITATIONS

We do not and cannot claim to have established all the precise effects of
works falling into the public domain. There may be effects that were not
measured or that apply to other industries left unexplored.
One limitation, of course, is that audiobooks are not necessarily
representative of copyright-eligible works as a whole. But perhaps the biggest
limitation of our data involves the difficulty of scientifically proving the lack
of a difference. Social scientific research and statistical methods are normally
aimed at demonstrating the existence of a difference between a treatment
group and a control group. When such a difference is shown, there is reason
to believe that it is the result of true differences between the groups. When
no difference is detected, however, the inverse inference is not necessarily
true. Failure to find an effect may be the result of an insufficiently sensitive
experimental design or inadequate statistical power.
While it is possible that some such problem accounts for our failure to
detect a difference between the quality of copyrighted or public domain
professional readings, the findings still likely track reality. First, this study
included hundreds of subjects sourced via multiple methods, which should
have provided the statistical power necessary to detect a difference. Recall,
also, that this study detected a significant difference between the quality of
Librivox recordings and the quality of professional recordings and a positive
correlation between the quality of a recording and the valuation of the
115. In addition, we found no meaningful effects based on prior exposure to the works,
although this likely was the result of the small sample of subjects who had prior experience
with the works.
116. Two sample t test, p = 0.3203.
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underlying work, although that correlation did not map on to differences
between the source of the reading (professional vs. Librivox).
Future research should continue to study the effects of the public
domain on the value of works. Perhaps other methods can be devised that
overcome some of these limitations. In the meantime, however, our data
suggest that anxieties about the public domain are substantially overblown.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS FOR IP LAW AND POLICY: THE NEXT
TIME DISNEY COMES KNOCKING

Our audiobook study has obvious implications for the ongoing
worldwide debate over the extension of copyright terms in existing works.
That debate has centered on factual assumptions about what happens to
works when they fall into the public domain-assumptions that are
contradicted by our data. In addition, our data on audiobook pricing, in
conjunction with similar data on book pricing, 17 illustrate one important
reason why the copyright term extension debate should matter to consumers:
we found higher prices for recordings of the most popular older works.
A.

ADDRESSING THE UNDERUSE HYPOTHESIS

Lack of availability has been the most prominent concern expressed by
Congress and commentators about works falling into the public domain. If
works tended to disappear after their copyright terms expired, a plausible
argument could be made for term extension because these lost works would
be unavailable for future readers, users, and creators. Consistent with several
previous studies," 8 however, we found that audiobooks were significantly
more likely to be made from older bestselling public domain works than
from bestselling copyrighted works from the same era. Even excluding
audiobooks available for free at the Librivox website, the public domain
works were more available to consumers in audiobook form. For the full
sample, public domain works were twice as likely to be available, and for the
sample of enduringly popular works, public domain titles were 20% more
likely to be available. These data suggest that copyright status, in fact, seems to reduce
availability, even for the most popular books. Even today, there are no unabridged
audio recordings for three of the most popular copyrighted novels in our
study: Magnificent Obsession by Lloyd Douglas, Mutiny on the Bounty by Nordoff
117. See Heald, Ficlion Bestsellers, supra note 13, at 1048-49; Petra Mosse, et al., Dead
Poets' Property - The Copyright Act of 1814 and the Price of Books in the Romantic Period
(Nov. 14, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2170447.
118. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
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and Hall, and Death Comes for the Archbishop by Willa Cather. Further, D.H.
Lawrence's Lady Chaterley's Lover (1930) did not appear as an unabridged
audiobook until 2011.
The finding that there is a greater availability of audiobooks made from
public domain works represents a significant advance over a previous study's
finding that bestselling public domain novels are more likely to be in print
and in more editions than the bestselling copyrighted novels from the same
era." 9 Unlike reprinted novels, audiobooks are derivative works that require
time and effort to produce. Professional versions of audiobooks can cost
substantial sums to record, produce, and market; yet, producers do not
hesitate to expend significant capital resources to produce their own versions
of the work. 2° Producers of audiobooks are clearly not deterred by their
inability to exclude competitors from making competing products. Of 171
public domain tides, 75 had audiobook versions (including 17 Librivox-only
versions), while of 173 copyright tides, only 27 had been made into
audiobooks. Producers appear more interested in expending capital to
produce public domain tides. As our data suggest, the market for public
domain audiobooks thrives even though multiple competing versions are
often available of the same work. A right to exclude is clearly not needed to
incentivize the production of audiobooks made from older works.
If the argument for copyright term extension turns on the need for
incentives to reproduce older works or create derivative works from them,
then existing empirical evidence suggests that term extensions are not needed
and are probably counter-productive.
B.

ADDRESSING THE OVERUSE HYPOTHESIS

As discussed in Part II, supra, economists not only worry about the
underuse of public domain works, but they also are concerned that some
works will be over-exploited if no single owner has the right to exclude
others. This tragedy-of-the-commons argument suggests that because no
individual has the right to exclude others, everyone has the incentive to rush
to exploit the resource while it has value. According to the argument, the
public will encounter public domain works so frequently that their value will

119. See Heald, FiclionBestsellers, supra note 13, at 1046-47.
120. See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 71, at 451 ("Firms producing copies or
derivatives of creative works after the copyright expires may be in the position of fisherman
on an open access lake. They produce at their own private optima, not taking into account
the effects that they have on other producers.").

2013] PUBLIC DOMAIN AND COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION

31

be lost. 121 Our data contradicts this alternative ground for copyright term
extension.
For the whole data set, we found an average of 3.3 recordings made for
each recorded public domain work and 3.0 recordings for each recorded

copyrighted book, an insignificant difference that provides no indication that
public domain books are over-exploited and worn out due to their
unprotected legal status. In addition, the average price of recorded books in
the full public domain data set and the full copyrighted data set was virtually
the same, suggesting that the value of the public domain works in
comparison to their copyrighted counterparts had not been destroyed by
overuse.
This study uncovered no evidence of over-exploitation even when we
consider only the most enduringly popular public domain and copyrighted
works. In that regard, this study revealed a significant difference in
exploitation rates, although the sample size was small. Within their respective
groups, the 20 most enduringly popular public domain books had an average
6.25 audiobook recordings per tide, while the 16 most popular copyrighted
works had only 3.25 audiobook recordings per tide. While this is evidence of
a higher level of exploitation, further data suggest that there is not evidence
of harmful overuse.
One clue that the increased availability of public domain works is not a
signal of over-exploitation comes from the pricing data that we
accumulated.122 Although audiobooks made from the durable public domain
works do not command as high a price, the price is still fairly high and close
to that for copyrighted works. Even with the competition that professional
public domain versions face from free recordings on Librivox, these versions
are still able to command market prices that are reasonably close to those
obtained by copyrighted works.
While professionally produced public domain audiobooks are priced
lower than copyrighted versions, there is little reason to believe that this price
difference is due to over-exploitation and the "wearing out" phenomenon.
Several compelling explanations for the price difference that are unrelated to
an overuse effect also exist. First, the producers of the audio recordings from
copyrighted books have to pay a royalty to the copyright owner that may
increase the cost of producing the work and raise its price in relation to the
public domain works, which require no such payment. Just as likely, the
121. For a succinct expression of this concern in the publicity rights context, see Bitton,
supra note 59, at 78 ("[]f everyone uses the likeness of Humphrey Bogart in advertising, it
will eventually become worthless.").
122. See supra Table 3.
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"intrabrand" competition between the multiple editions of the audiobooks
based on the same public domain work will drive down their prices even in
the absence of any "wearing out" phenomenon. Note, however, that despite
this competition and the competition from free Librivox recordings, the
price for professionally produced public domain audiobooks is still fairly
high. Finally, data presented in a prior study suggest a significant disparity in
the popularity and appeal of the public domain and copyrighted titles at
issue. 123 If the copyrighted works are indeed more iconic, then we would
expect versions of them to be sold at a higher price. Overall, the pricing
disparity between audiobooks based on public domain and copyrighted
works does not convince us that the public has seen its most valuable public
domain works dangerously over-recorded.
In addition, as a practical matter, it is difficult to see how the availability
of multiple versions of an audiobook would diminish the value of the
underlying work. No one is forced to consume an audiobook, so multiple
copies are not flung in the face of the consuming public who then become
tired of hearing the story. If audiobooks were played in the background of
commercials or department stores, perhaps repetitive, choice-less
consumption might negatively affect consumer attitudes, but audiobooks are
not used that way. And even with music, which does appear in commercials
and in the background ambience of shopping areas, we suspect that
businesses try not to alienate their customers by overusing the same music.
123. See Heald, Fiction Bestsellers, supra note 13, at 1046-47. Heald wrote:
[A]s of 1965, when all of the forty durable books were still protected by
copyright, only five of the twenty books (1913-1922) that have since
fallen into the public domain had sold 1,000,000 copies. As of the same
date, eleven of the twenty books (1923-1932) still protected by copyright
today had sold 1,000,000 copies, despite having on the average ten fewer
years to accomplish that feat. Even more tellingly, the top five books
from the public domain set (1913-1922) had sold a total of only 7,381,709
volumes as of 1965, while the top five sellers from the copyrighted set
(1923-1932) had sold 20,289,943 volumes. And as of 1965, the top five
books still protected by copyright had fifteen fewer years to sell than
those that have since fallen into the public domain. Sales data for books
selling fewer than 1,000,000 copies as of 1965 is not publicly available. An
update on books that had sold over 2,000,000 volumes by 1975
reemphasizes the comparative popularity of the books published from
1923-1932. Only one of the durable books published from 1913-1922 is
on the list (Of Human Bondage, with sales of 2,609,236), while seven from
1923-1932 are on the list. Sales of those seven books, as of 1975, totaled

28,732,714.
Id. (citing ALICE PAYNE HACKET, 70 YEARS OF BEST

SELLERS,

1895-1965, at 111-45

(1967); ALICE PAYNE HACKETr & JAMEs HENRY BuRKE, 80 YEARS OF BEST SELLERS,
1895-1975 (1977)).
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Market discipline should make over-exploitation highly unlikely-it is just
bad business. It is difficult to imagine how any harm flows from the higher
exploitation rate that we measured in the set of the twenty most enduringly
popular public domain works.
C.

ADDRESSING THE TARNISHMENT HYPOTHESIS

Although many legal analysts are skeptical of the claim that
"inappropriate" uses of a work can negatively affect its value,' 2 4 the present
study is the first to evaluate empirically the claim that a work will be
tarnished by unconstrained uses in the absence of a copyright owner to
"husband" the work and protect it from the ravages of the free market. One
of us has earlier argued that even pornographic version of works are unlikely
to affect value, 25 but one could imagine, for example, that a truly horrible
movie made from a book might have an effect on the sales of the book. If

the Howardthe Duck comic book had still been regularly in print at the time of
the release of its famously awful movie version,126 perhaps sales would have
dropped (although such a fate would also serve as an example of how
copyright ownership does not prevent debasement). By the same token, one
could imagine that someone listening to an inferior recording of an
audiobook might become less likely to consume the underlying written work,
thereby diminishing its value.
Given how easily supporters of copyright term extension can assert the
claim of misuse of works in the public domain, it was critical to take the
debasement argument seriously. The audiobook context provided an
attractive opportunity for study because the claim of tarnishment caused by a
poor audiobook reading seems more credible than the claim that Santa Claus

124. See Richard A. Epstein, Liberty versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyrigbt
Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1, 26 (2005) ("Anyone is hard pressed to believe that
Shakespeare's star has been dimmed by the calamities committed in his name ... .'); cf. Yi
Qian, Counterfeiters:Foes or Friends? (NBER Working Paper No. 16785, 2011) (finding that the
advertising benefits of counterfeits in the market outweigh any substitution losses); Ren~e
Ann Richardson Gosline, The Real Value of Fakes: Dynamic Symbolic Boundaries in
Socially Embedded Consumption (May 5, 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard
Business School) (on file with authors) (finding "social networks enable counterfeit
consumers to develop relationships with the authentic brand").
125. See Heald, Musical Compositions, supra note 13, at 25-26.
126. See Howard the Duck (film), WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Howard-

theDuck_(fdlm) (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) ('The film frequently ranks among the worst
films of all time.").
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has been debased by the numerous pornographic movies with "Santa"
appearing in the title. 27
Part II explained that any claim of debasement in the audiobook market
would be predicated on two underlying factual assumptions. First, readers of
public domain audiobooks are inferior to readers of copyrighted audiobooks;
and second, the inferior versions of the audiobooks negatively affect
consumers' valuation of the underlying work. We found little support for
either assumption.
Regarding the first prong of the tarnishment hypothesis, professional
readers of audiobooks made from public domain works were rated just as
highly as professional readers of copyrighted books. The companies that
produce public domain audiobooks appear to be selecting readers who are as
talented as those selected for copyrighted titles. According to the results of
our study, when consumers go to the three main sources for audiobooks
(www.audible.com, Amazon, and Barnes & Noble), they will likely find that
the public domain books are as well produced as the copyrighted books.
These data substantially undermine any claim of debasement in the most
important market for audiobooks. Market discipline is apparently sufficient
to ensure that the producer of an audiobook for commercial sale will hire a
competent reader. Producers of audiobooks would like to establish a positive
reputation and make a steady profit in the market.128 It should be no surprise
that such producers take adequate care in the selection of readers, whether
the underlying work chosen for exploitation is copyrighted or in the public
domain. Amateur readers who distributed audio versions of public domain
books on Librivox were, not surprisingly, rated significantly lower than
professional readers of the same books. Non-professionals using their own
equipment produce significantly lower quality recordings than professional
readers in recording studios.
The question for the second prong of the tarnishment hypothesis, then,
is whether these lower quality recordings resulted in lower valuations of the
underlying works. Although we did find a positive correlation between the
quality of readings and the subjects' valuation of the underlying work, that
effect did not correlate with the source of the recording. In other words,
127. See Search Results for "Santa", INTERNET ADULT FILM DATABASE,
www.iafd.com/results.asp?searchtype=titde&searchstring=santa (searching for "Santa" under
the tide criterion) (last visited May 23, 2012).
128. On the value of attribution and reputation in intellectual property, see Christopher
Jon Sprigman, Christopher Buccafusco & Zachary Burns, ValuingAttribution and Publication in
Intellectual Property, 93 BOSTON U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2011403 (finding that creators significantly value opportunities
for attribution).
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quality correlates with valuation whether the subject listened to an amateur
recording, a professional recording of a public domain book, or a
professional recording of a copyrighted book. However, the absolute values
assigned to the underlying works by subjects who listened to audiobooks
from all three sources were not significantly different. So, the tarnishment
thesis has some force, but ownership does not prevent tarnishment in this
particular market. Of course, this is contrary to what proponents of term
extension argue: that ownership prevents tarnishment in a way that free
market discipline does not.
We do not and cannot claim that our data conclusively prove that falling
into the public domain has no effect on the value of a work. But even if
works are theoretically harmed by falling into the public domain, proponents
of term extension should be expected to establish such losses empirically
because term extension comes with considerable costs that must be justified.
One such cost, already noted, involves pricing. The exclusive rights granted
by copyright can sometimes allow owners to charge above-market rates for
their products. Imposing such costs on consumers is only worthwhile if the
public is getting something valuable in return. Another cost of copyright to
consumers is diminished availability. We show that twice as many public
domain books have audio versions compared to copyrighted books. If
proponents feel that imposing these costs are justified, then they should
support their arguments with more than bare assertions.
Perhaps more important than the cost to consumers, other creators must
bear higher costs when existing works continue to remain subject to
copyright protection. Creators may wish to perform these works, adapt them
for new uses, or incorporate them into other kinds of works.129 When works
are protected by copyright, however, creators must obtain a license or face
stiff legal penalties. This license requirement creates multiple problems for
new creators and, thus, the public. Copyright owners may demand more in
licensing fees than creators are willing or able to pay, resulting in works not
getting made.13 ° In other cases, the copyright owners may be impossible to
locate and contact. For these "orphan works," the opportunity for bargaining
over their use is impossible, and again, derivative works remain uncreated. If
the public is going to be asked to bear costs for an additional period of years,

129. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004).
130. See Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creaiviy Effect, supra note 13 (showing that owners of
IP rights often demand substantially more money to license their works than others are
willing to pay, leading to inefficiencies in IP markets).

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28:1

it is incumbent upon term-extension proponents to establish that those costs
are worth bearing.
D.

TARNISHMENT BEYOND TERM EXTENSION

In addition, our audiobook quality and valuation data may be relevant in
multiple contexts outside the copyright-term-extension debate. First, some
copyright fair use disputes seem to turn on the argument that inappropriate
uses will devalue a copyrighted work. For example, those who oppose the
publication of fan fiction (for example, new Harry Potter tales concocted by
enthusiastic fans on the internet13) often allege that the copyrighted
characters will be tarnished by unconstrained storytelling on the web.' 3 2 The
data may suggest that amateur fan fiction is unlikely to negatively affect the
value of the underlying character franchise.
Second, outside of the realm of copyright law, this study might provide
support for those who applaud the judiciary's continuing reluctance to
vigorously implement the Federal Trademark Anti-Dilution Act.' 33 The
tarnishment prong of dilution doctrine asserts that a trademark loses some of
its intrinsic value when consumers encounter the mark used in an
inappropriate context, such as when the mark is placed on goods of inferior
quality. The data show that listeners to Librivox recordings find the readers
to be inferior but do not translate that sentiment to a significantly lower
valuation of the associated work. Similarly, the doctrine of post-sale
confusion in trademark law rests on the assumption that a trademark owner
is harmed when a bystander merely observes a trademark on an inferior
product (imagine someone who sees a poor quality Chicago Bears sweat shirt
without knowing that it is a knock off). The data suggest that the assumption
of such harm is unrealistic and comport with previous studies suggesting that
lower quality counterfeits may increase the value of the authentic brand. 34
V.

CONCLUSION
The copyright term extension debate, as it once again begins to heat up,

will have substantial consequences for the creative industries and the
131. See HARRYPOTTERFANFICTION.COM, http://www.harrypotterfanfiction.com/ (last
visited Nov. 4, 2012) (containing over 78,000 Harry Potter stories written by fans).
132. See Karjala, supra note 76; Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copytight Law and
Subcultural Creativity, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135 (2007).
133. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2011) (creating a cause of action against diluting and
tarnishing uses of a famous trademark).
134. See Qian, supra note 124 (finding that the advertising benefits of counterfeits in the
market outweigh any substitution losses); Gosline, supra note 124, at iii (finding "social
networks enable counterfeit consumers to develop relationships with the authentic brand").
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consuming public. If copyrighted works begin to enter the public domain,
their owners will stand to lose millions of dollars in revenue. On the other
hand, that revenue comes directly from consumers' pockets, and the
expiration of valuable copyrights would save consumers considerable costs.
Perhaps more importantly, those works will be available to an army of
creative artists who will be able to use them in their works in ways that were
impossible while the works were copyrighted. Whether this use will be a
good thing if and when it happens is an empirical question that is susceptible
to quantitative measurement. This Article has attempted to address that
question.
The data suggest that the three principal arguments in favor of copyright
term extension-underuse, overuse, and tarnishment-are unsupported.
There seems little reason to fear that once works fall into the public domain,
their value will be substantially reduced by the amount or manner of their
use. Although there may be costs associated with movement into the public
domain, allowing open access to public domain works will yield considerable
benefits. These benefits should dramatically outweigh the costs.
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APPENDIX A: FULL SAMPLE OF BESTSELLING
NOVELS, 1913-1932
Public Domain Works (1913-1922)
John Fox, Heart of the Hills (1913); Robert Herrick, His Great Adventure
(1913); Jack London, John Barleycorn (1913); Gene Porter, Laddie (1913); Willa
Cather, 0 Pioneers (1913); Eleanor Porter, Polyanna (1913); 0. Henry, Rolling
Stones (1913); D.H. Lawrence, Sons and Lovers (1913); Frances Burnett, T.
Tembarom (1913); Jeffrey Farnol, The Amateur Gentleman (1913); Winston
Churchill, The Inside of the Cup (1913); Rex Beach, The Iron Trail (1913); Gilbert
Parker, The Judgment House (1913); W.B. Maxwell, The Devil's Garden (1913);
Jack London, The Valle of the Moon (1913); Hall Caine, The Woman Thou
Gavest Me (1913); Henry Harrison, V.V.'S Eyes (1913); Ellen Glasgow,
Virginia (1913); Robert Herrick, Clark's Field (1914); James Joyce, Dubliners
(1914); Leona Dalrymple, Diane of the Green Van (1914); Booth Tarkington,
Penrod (1914); Edgar Burroughs, Tartan of the Apes (1914); Rex Beach, The
Auction Block (1914); Harold Wright, The Eyes of the World (1914); William
Locke, The Fortunate Youth (1914); George Barr McCutcheon, The Prince of
Graustark (1914); Mary Watts, The Rise of Jennie Cushing (1914); Owen
Johnson, The Salamander (1914); Frank Norris, Vandover and the Brute (1914);
Winston Churchill, A Far County (1915); Henry Harrison, Angela's Business
(1915); Jean Webster, Dear Enemy (1915); F. Hopkinson Smith, Felix O'Day
(1915); William Locke, Jaffey (1915); Mary Roberts Rinehart, K (1915); Gene
Stratton Porter, Michael O'Halloran (1915); Somerset Maugham, Of Human
Bondage (1915); Irving Cobb, Old Judge Priest (1915); Eleanor Porter, Polyanna
Grows Up (1915); Harry Leon Wilson, Ruggles of Red Gap (1915); Dorothy
Canfield, The Bent Twig (1915); Theodore Dreiser, The Genius (1915); Stewart
White, The Gray Dawn (1915); Ernest Poole, The Harbor (1915); Raphael
Sabatini, The Sea-Hawk (1915); Zane Grey, The Lone Star Ranger (1915); Willa
Cather, The Song of the Lark (1915); Booth Tarkington, The Turmoil (1915);
James Joyce, A Portraitof the Artist (1916); Ethel Dell, Bars of Iron (1916); Peter
Bernard Kyne, Cappy Ricks (1916); William McFee, Casuals of the Sea (1916);
Eleanor Porter, Just David (1916); Ellen Glasgow, Life and Gabriella (1916);
H.G. Wells, Mr. Britling Sees it Through (1916); Frank Spearman, Nan of Music
Mountain (1916); Booth Tarkington, Seventeen (1916); Winston Churchill, The
Dwelling Place of Light (1916); Kathleen Norris, The Heart of Rachael (1916);
William Dean Howells, The Leatherwood God (1916); Henry Kitchen Webster,
The RealAdventure (1916); Harold Wright, When a Man's a Man (1916); Edith
Wharton, Xingu (1916); Ring Lardner, You Know Me, Al (1916); Alice
Cholmondeley, Chrisine (1917); Edna Ferber, Fanny Herself (1917); Ring

2013]

PUBLIC DOMAIN AND COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION

39

Lardner, Gullible's Travels (1917); Ernest Poole, His Famiy (1917); Robert
Hichens, In the Wilderness (1917); Christopher Morley, Parnassus on Wheels
(1917); David Graham Phillips, Susan Lennox: Her Rise and Fall (1917); James
Branch Cabell, The Cream of the Jest (1917); Jeffrey Farnol, The Definite Object
(1917); Ethel Dell, The Hundredth Chance (1917); Ralph Connor, The Major
(1917); Irving Bacheller, The Light in the Clearing (1917); William Locke, The
Red Planet (1917); Stephen McKenna, Sonia (1917); Eleanor Porter, The Road
to Understanding (1917); May Sinclair, The Tree of Heaven (1917); Joseph
Hergesheimer, The Three Black Pennys (1917); Zane Grey, Wildfire (1917); Gene
Porter, A Daughter of the Land (1918); Thorne Smith, Biltmore Oswald (1918);
Zona Gale, Birth (1918); Zane Grey, The Desert of Wheat (1918); Edward
Streeter, Dere Mable (1918); V. Blasco Ibanez, The Four Horsemen of the
Apocalypse (1918); Joseph Hergesheimer, Java Head (1918); Willa Cather, My
Antonia (1918); Eleanor Porter, Oh, Money! Oh, Money (1918); Mary Roberts
Rinehart, The Amazing Interlude (1918); Booth Tarkington, The Magnificent
Ambersons (1918); Emerson Hough, The Passing of the Frontier (1918);
E. Phillips Oppenheim, The Pawns Count (1918); Robert Chambers, The
Restless Sex (1918); Temple Bailey, The Tin Soldier (1918); Zane Grey, The U.P.
Trail (1918); Treat 'Em Rough, Ring Lardner (1918); Margaret Atherton, The
Avalanche (1919); Elizabeth von Arnim, Christopherand Columbus (1919); Mary
Roberts Rinehart, Dangerous Days (1919); Gene Porter, Dawn (1919);
Winston Churchill, Dr. Jonathan (1919); Frannie Hurst, Humoresque (1919);
Robert Chambers, In Secret (1919); James Cabell, JuTgen (1919); Albert
Terhune, Lad,A Dog (1919); Ethel Dell, The Lamp in the Desert (1919); Joseph
Hergesheimer, Linda Condon (1919); Joseph Conrad, The Arrow of Gold (1919);
Irving Bachellor, A Man for the Ages (1919); Ellen Glasgow, The Builders
(1919); Harold Wright, The Re-Creation of Brian Kent (1919); James Curwood,
The River's End (1919); Emerson Hough, The Sagebrusher (1919); Ralph
Connor, The Sky Pilot in No Man's Land (1919); Sherwood Anderson,
Winesburg, Ohio (1919); Edith Wharton, The Age of Innocence (1920); Kathleen
Norris, Harriet and the Piper (1920); Peter Kyne, Kindred of the Dust (1920);
Sinclair Lewis, Main Street (1920); Eleanor Porter, May-Marie (1920); Zona
Gale, Miss Lulu Bett (1920); Floyd Dell, Moon Calf (1920); James Huneker,
Painted Veils (1920); Sherwood Anderson, Poor White (1920); Mary Roberts
Rinehart, A Poor Wise Man (1920); E. Phillips Oppenheim, The Great
Impersonation (1920); Zane Grey, The Man of the Forest (1920); Joseph Lincoln,
The Portygee (1920); Anne Sedgwick, The Third Window (1920); Francis
Fitzgerald, This Side ofParadise(1920); James Curwood, The Vally of Silent Men
(1920); Booth Tarkington, Alice Adams (1921); Ben Hecht, Erik Dorn (1921);
Harold Bell Wright, Helen of the Old House (1921); Gene Porter, Her Father's
Daughter (1921); A.S.M. Hutchinson, If Winter Comes (1921); Brian Donne-
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Byrne, Messer Marco Polo (1921); Rafael Sabatini, Saramouche (1921); Ring
Lardner, The Big Town (1921); Dorothy Fisher, The Brimming Cup (1921); Eden
Phillpotts, The Grey Room (1921); Coningsby Dawson, The Kingdom Round the
Corner (1921); Louis Hemon, Maria Chapdelaine (1921); Zane Grey, The
Mysterious Rider (1921); Don Marquis, The Old Soak (1921); Willa Cather, One
of Ours (1921); Edith Hull, The Sheik (1921); Gertrude Atherton, The Sisters in
Law (1921); Sherwood Anderson, The Triumph of the Egg (1921); John Passos,
Three Soldiers (1921); Sinclair Lewis, Babitt (1922); Thomas Stribling, Birthright
(1922); Booth Tarkington, Gentle Julia (1922); Carl Vechten, Peter Whiffle
(1922); Robert Keable, Simon Called Peter (1922); Francis Fitzgerald, The
Beautiful and the Damned (1922); Mary Roberts Rinehart, The Breaking Point
(1922); Raphael Sabatini, Captain Blood (1922); Emerson Hough, The Covered
Wagon (1922); Temple Bailey, The Dim Lantern (1922); Elizabeth von Arnim,
The Enchanted April (1922); Edward Cummings, The Enormous Room (1922);
Frances Burnett, The Head of the House of Coombe (1922); A.S.M. Hutchinson,
This Freedom (1922); James Joyce, Uysses (1922); Herbert Quick, Vandermark's
Folly (1922); Christopher Morley, Where the Blue Begins (1922).
Copyrighted Works (1923-1932)
Willa Cather, A Lost Lady (1923); Gertrude Atherton, Black Oxen (1923);
Phillip Gibbs, The Heirs Apparent (1923); Arthur Train, His Children's Children
(1923); Elliot Paul, Impromptu (1923); Mazo de la Roche, Jalna (1923); John
Dos Passos, Streets of Night (1923); Margaret Wilson, The Able McLaughlins
(1923); Robert Chambers, The Hiackers (1923); Harold Bell Wright, The Mine
with the Iron Door (1923); Zane Grey, The Wanderer of the Wasteland (1923);
James Oliver Curwood, A Gentleman of Courage (1924); Margaret Kennedy, The
Constant Nymph (1924); Will James, Cowboys, North and South (1924); Michael
Arlen, The Green Hat (1924); Clarence Mulford, Hopalong Cassidy Returns
(1924); Ernest Hemingway, In Our Time (1924); Emerson Hough, Mother of
Gold (1924); Edith Wharton, Old New York (1924); Edna Ferber, So Big
(1924); Coningsby Dawson, The Coast of Folly (1924); Louis Bromfield, The
Green Bay Tree (1924); Dorothy Fisher (1924); Anne Douglas Sedgwick, The
Little French Girl (1924); Booth Tarkington, The Midlander (1924); Percy
Marks, The Plastic Age (1924); Robert Herrick, Waste (1924); Theodore
Dreiser, An American Tragedy (1925); Sinclair Lewis, Arrowsmith (1925); Ellen
Glasgow, Barren Ground (1925); PC Wren, Beau Geste (1924); Sherwood
Anderson, Dark Laughter (1925); James Boyd, Drums (1925); Anita Loos,
Gentlemen PreferBlondes (1925); E. Barrington, GloriousApollo (1925); John Dos
Passos, Manhattan Transfer (1925); ASM Hutchinson, One Increasing Pupose
(1925); Robert Benchley, Pluck and Luck (1925); DuBose Heyward, Porgy
(1925); John Erskine, The Private Life of Helen of Troy (1925); A. Hamilton
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Gibbs, Soundings (1925); Rafael Sabatini, The Carolinian(1925); Francis Scott
Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby (1925); Gene Stratton Porter, The Keeper of the Bees
(1925); Gertrude Stein, The Making of Americans (1925); Anne Parrish, The
PerennialBachelor (1925); Willa Cather, The Professor'sHouse (1925); Christopher
Morley, Thunder on the Left (1925); Susan Ertz, After Noon (1925); PC Wren,
Beau Sabreur(1926); Louis Bromfield, Eary Autumn (1926); Dorothy Canfield,
Her Son's Wife (1926); Carl Van Vechten, Nigger Heaven (1926); Zona Gale,
Preface to a Life (1926); Edna Ferber, Show Boat (1926); William Faulkner,
Soldier's Pay (1926); Warwick Deeping, Sorrell and Son (1926); Thomas
Stribling, Teeftallow (1926); Temple Bailey, The Blue Window (1926); Sylvia
Thompson, The Hounds of Spring (1926); Ellen Glasgow, The Romantic
Comedians (1926); John Galsworthy, The Silver Spoon (1926); James Branch
Cabell, The Silver Stallion (1926); Ernest Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises (1926);
Elizabeth Roberts, The Time of Man (1926); Thorne Smith, Topper (1926); A.A.
Milne, Winnie-the-Pooh (1926); Louis Bromfield, A Good Woman (1927); Julia
Peterkin, Black April (1927); Conrad Aiken, Blue Voyage (1927); Thornton
Wilder, The Bridge of San Luis Rey (1927); Willa Cather, Death Comes for the
Archbishop (1927); Warwick Deeping, Doomsday (1927); Sinclair Lewis, Elmer
Ganty (1927); Honore Willsie Morrow, Forever Free (1927); Ole Rolvaag,
Giants in the Earth (1927); Mary Roberts Rinehart, Lost Ecstasy (1927); James
Boyd, Marching On (1927); Ernest Hemingway, Men Without Women (1927);
Glenway Westcott, The Grandmothers (1927); Don Marquis, The Lives and Times
of Archy Mehitabel (1927); Anne Douglas Sedgwick, The Old Countess (1927);
Booth Tarkington, The Plutocrat (1927); Anne Parrish, Tomorrow Morning
(1927); Edith Wharton, Twilight Sleep (1927); Fannie Hurst, A President is Born
(1928); Anne Parrish, All Kneeling (1928); Vina Delmar, Bad Girl (1928);
Booth Tarkington, ClaireAmbler (1928); H.W. Freeman, Joseph and his Brethren
(1928); Honore Willsie Morrow, May Todd Lincoln (1928); Roark Bradford,
Ol Man Adam n His Chillun (1928); Warwick Deeping, Old Pybus (1928); Julia
Peterkin, Scarlet Sister May (1928); John Galsworthy, Swan Song (1928); S.S.
Van Dine, The Greene Murder Case (1928); Louis Bromfield Stokes, The Strange
Case of Miss Annie Spragg (1928); Hugh Walpole, Wintersmoon (1928); Ernest
Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms (1929); Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on
the Western Front (1929); Anne Douglas Sedgwick, Dark Hester (1929); Sinclair
Lewis, Dodsworth (1929); James Thurber, Is Sex Necessay? (1929); Oliver
LaFarge, Laughing Boy (1929); Thomas Wolfe, Look Homeward, Angel (1929);
Lloyd Douglas, Magnificent Obsession (1929); DuBose Heyward, Mamba's
Daughters (1929); O.E. Rolvaag, Peder Victorious (1929); Warwick Deeping,
Reaper's Row (1929); Ellen Glasgow, They Stooped to Foly (1929); SS Van Dine,
The Bishop Murder Case (1929); Susan Glaspell, The Fugitives Return (1929);
Susan Ertz, The Galaxy (1929); Ellery Queen, The Roman Hat Mysteg (1929);
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William Faulkner, The Sound and the Fury (1929); Susan Glaspell, Alison's House
(1930); J.B. Priestly, Angel Pavement (1930); Kenneth Roberts, Arundel (1930);
A. Hamilton Gibbs, Chances (1930); Edna Ferber, Cimarron (1930); Warwick
Deeping, Exile (1930); Katherine Anne Porter, Flowering Judas (1930); Vicki
Baum, Grand Hotel (1930); Michael Gold, Jews Without Money (1930); D.H.
Lawrence, Lady Chatterley'sLover (1930); William McFee, North of Suez (1930);
Hugh Walpole, Rogue Herries (1930); John Dos Passos, The 42d Parallel(1930);
Arthur Train, The Adventures of Ephraim Tutt (1930); Mary Roberts Rinehart,
The Door (1930); Elizabeth Madox Roberts, The Great Meadow (1930); Dashiell
Hammett, The Maltese Falcon (1930); Thornton Wilder, The Woman of Andros
(1930); Honore Willsie Morrow, Tiger! Tiger! (1930); Louis Bromfield, TwenyFour Hours (1930); Margaret Ayer Barnes, Years of Grace (1930); Katharine
Brush, Young Man of Manhattan (1930); Bess Streeter Aldrich, A White Bird
Flying (1931); Susan Glaspell, Ambrose Holt and Family (1931); Fannie Hurst,
Back Street (1931); Honore Willsie Morrow, Black Daniel (1931); Mazo de la
Roche, Finch's Fortune (1931); William McFee, The Harbourmaster(1931); John
Galsworthy, Maid in Waiting (1931); William Faulkner, Sanctuagv (1931); Willa
Cather, Shadows on the Rock (1931); Warwick Deeping, The Bridge of Desire
(1931); Thomas Stribling, The Forge (1931); Pearl Buck The Good Earth (1931);
Ernest Hergesheimer, The Limestone Tree (1931); Thorne Smith, The Night Life
of the Gods (1931); Erich Maria Remarque, The Road Back (1931); Ole Rolvaag,
Their Fathers' God (1931); Sherwood Anderson, Beyond Desire (1932); Aldous
Huxley, Brave New World (1932); Julia Peterkin, Bright Skin (1932); Vardis
Fisher, In Tragic life (1932); Phyllis Bentley, Inheritance (1932); Louis Golding,
Magnolia Street (1932); Booth Tarkington, Magy's Neck (1932); Charles Barnard
Nordoff, Mutiny on the Bounoy (1932); Warwick Deeping, Old Wine and New
(1932); Pearl Buck, Sons (1932); Phillip Stong, State Fair (1932); Thorne
Smith, The Bishop's Jaegers (1932); Robert Herrick, The End of Desire (1932);
Charles Morgan, The Fountain (1932); Ellen Glasgow, The ShelteredLife (1932);
Thomas Stribling, The Store (1932); AJ Cronin, Three Loves (1932); Erskine
Caldwell, Tobacco Road (1932); Sinclair Lewis, Ann Vickers (1933); Hervey
Allen, Anthony Adverse (1933); Gladys Carroll, As the Earth Turns (1933); Lloyd
Douglas, Forgive us our Treipasses (1933); Erskine Caldwell, God's Little Acre
(1933); Caroline Miller, Lamb in his Bosom (1933); Hans Fallada, Little Man,
What Now? (1933); Bess Streeter Aldrich, Miss Bishop (1933); William McFee,
No Castle in Spain (1933); John Galsworthy, One More River (1933); Robert
Herrick, One More Spring (1933); Philip Stong, Stranger's Return (1933); Louis
Bromfield, The Farm (1933); Mazo de la Roche, The Master of Jalna (1933);
Ernest Hemingway, Winner Take Nothing (1933).
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APPENDIX B: DURABLE FICTION BESTSELLERS,
1913-1932
Public Domain Durable Works
Sherwood Anderson, Winesburg Ohio (1919); Edgar Burroughs, Tartan of
the Apes (1914); Willa Cather, My Antonia (1918); Willa Cather, 0 Pioneers!
(1913); Willa Cather, The Song of the Lark (1915); F. Scott Fitzgerald, The
Beautiful and the Damned (1922); F. Scott Fitzgerald, This Side of Paradise(1920);
Zane Grey, The Lone Star Ranger (1915); James Joyce, A Portraitof the Artist as
a Young Man (1916); James Joyce, Dubliners (1914); James Joyce, Ulysses (1922);
D.H. Lawrence, Sons and Lovers (1913); Sinclair Lewis, Main Street (1920);
Sinclair Lewis, Babbitt (1922); W. Somerset Maugham, Of Human Bondage
(1915); Eleanor H. Porter, Pol/yanna (1913); Rafael Sabatini, Captain Blood
(1922); Rafael Sabatini, Scaramouche (1921); Booth Tarkington, The Magnicent
Ambersons (1918); Edith Wharton, The Age of Innocence (1920).
Copyrighted Durable Works
Pearl S. Buck, The Good Earth (1931); Willa Cather, Death Comes for the
Archbishop (1927); John Dos Passos, Manhattan Transfer (1925); Theodore
Dreiser, An American Tragedy (1925); William Faulkner, Sanctuary (1931);
William Faulkner, The Sound and the Fury (1929); F. Scott Fitzgerald, The
Great Gatsby (1925); Dashiell Hammett, The Maltese Falcon (1930); Ernest
Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms (1929); Ernest Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises
(1926); Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (1932); D.H. Lawrence, Lady
Chatterley's Lover (1930); Sinclair Lewis, Arrowsmith (1925); Sinclair Lewis,
Elmer Ganty (1927); A.A. Milne, Winnie-The-Pooh (1926); Charles Nordhoff,
Mutiny on the Bounty (1932); Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the Western
Front (1929); Thornton Wilder, The Bridge of San Luis Rey (1927); Thomas
Wolfe, Look Homeward, Angel (1929); Percival Christopher Wren, Beau Geste
(1925).

